My High Dividend Stocks Blog

My High Dividend Stocks
This is my high dividend stocks site where I help site members find high dividend stocks with earning power and strong balance sheets.

AGNC analysis of the income account> extraordinary losses> amortization of bond discount

American Capital Agency Corp. (AGNC) has not floated any bonds since it began operating in May 2008.  Therefore, no adjustments to its income account are necessary for amortization of bond discount.  You can see from their most recent quarterly 10-K filing that they have no bond liabilities.  Their biggest liabilities are repurchase agreements (6.6 billion dollars).  Repurchase agreements are not bonds.

 

The bottom line is that companies can manipulate their future earnings by charging amortization of bond discounts to their surplus instead of their income statements.

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Here is the relevant section from Securities Analysis:

 

Amortization of Bond Discount. Bonds are usually floated by corporations at a price to net the treasury less than par. The discount suffered is part of the cost of borrowing the money, i.e., part of the interest burden, and it should be amortized over the life of the bond issue by an annual charge against earnings, included with the statement of interest paid. It was formerly considered “conservative” to write off such bond discounts by a single charge against surplus, in order not to show so intangible an item among the assets on the balance sheet. More recently these write-offs against surplus have become popular for the opposite reason, viz., to eliminate future annual deductions from earnings and in that way to make the shares more “valuable.”

 

Example: Associated Gas and Electric Company charged against surplus in 1932 the sum of $5,892,000 for “debt discount and expense” written off.

 

This practice has aroused considerable criticism in recent years both from the New York Stock Exchange and from the S.E.C. As a result of these objections a number of companies have reversed their previous charge to surplus and are again charging amortization of bond discounts annually against earnings.

High dividend stocks – AGNC analysis of the income account> extraordinary losses> idle-plant expense

American Capital Agency Corp. (AGNC) does not own any plant equipment; therefore, they have no idle-plant expenses.  No adjustment to the income account is necessary for this category of analysis.  Learn more about how idle-plant expense accounting can effect earnings by reading the section below.

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The cost of carrying non-operating properties should almost always be charged against income account.  Idle-plant expenses are of a different nature than ordinary charges against income.  The idle-plant expenses should be of a temporary and therefore non-recurring type.  The company’s management can terminate the losses at any time by disposing of or abandoning the property.  If, for the time being, the company elects to spend money to carry these assets along in the expectation that future value will justify the outlay, it does not seem logical to consider these assets as equivalent to a permanent liability, i.e., as a permanent drag upon the company’s earning power, which makes the stock worth considerably less than it would be if these “assets” did not exist.

Some companies in the past had charged their idle-plant expenses to their surplus.  That relieved their reported earnings of expenditures that most companies charge against income.  They should have charged to their income account.

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High dividend stocks – AGNC analysis of the income account> extraordinary losses> other elements in inventory accounting

Different methods of inventory accounting can skew earnings reports.  However, the subject of this article is not applicable to AGNC.  I searched for the words “inventory”, “inventories”, “last-in”, “first-out”, and “costs of goods sold” in AGNC's 2009 annual report and most recent quarterly 10-K filing.  Those words do not appear in their SEC filings.

I decided to reprint the relevant section of Securities Analysis 2nd edition since the subject of inventory accounting is not applicable to AGNC:

Other Elements in Inventory Accounting. The student of corporate reports must familiarize himself with two permissible variations from the usual accounting practice in handling inventories. As is well known, the standard procedure consists of taking inventory at the close of the year at the lower of cost or market. The “cost of goods sold” is then found by adding purchases to the opening inventory and subtracting the closing inventory, valued as described.

Last-In, First-Out. The first variation from this method consists of taking as the cost of goods sold the actual amount paid for the most recently acquired lots. The theory behind this method is that a merchant’s selling price is related mainly to the current replacement price or the recent cost of the article sold. The point is of importance only when there are substantial changes in unit values from year to year; it cannot affect the aggregate reported profits over a long period but only the division of results from one year to another; it may be useful in reducing income tax by avoiding alternations of loss and profit due to inventory fluctuations.  

The Normal-stock or Basic-stock Inventory Method. A more radical method of minimizing fluctuations due to inventory values has been followed by a considerable number of companies for some years past. This method is based on the theory that the company must regularly carry a certain physical stock of materials and that there is no more reason to vary the value of this “normal stock” from year to year—because of market changes—than there would be to vary the value of the manufacturing plant as the price index rises or falls and to reflect this change in the year’s operations. In order to permit the base inventory to be carried at an unchanging figure, the practice is to mark it down to a very low unit price level—so low that it should never be necessary to reduce it further to get it down to current market.

High dividend stocks – AGNC analysis of the income account> extraordinary losses> reserves for inventory losses

Article_for_2010_09_08_agnc_ex

Definition for inventory: (accounting) the value of a firm's current assets including raw materials and work in progress and finished goods. Source “define: inventory” on Google.

AGNC’s current assets are mostly comprised of agency securities (over $6 billion in a $7.1 billion investment portfolio). These agency securities are toxic assets in my opinion. They will be viewed as toxic assets by AGNC’s shareholders the moment that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac stop guaranteeing the pass-through principal and interest payments of the securitized mortgages that these agency securities are comprised of. You know they are toxic because the Federal Reserve bought over 1 trillion dollars of them from Fannie and Freddie over the course of a year ending in March 2010. The Fed buys toxic assets to bailout the largest banks.

I scanned through the most recent 10-K filing and the 2009 annual report to find out if AGNC’s management set up a reserve fund for future losses on their inventory/assets.  It turns out they haven’t set up such a reserve.  They do acknowledge the risks to their asset values under the banner of “spread risk” in the most recent 10-K filing.

Spread Risk
Our available−for−sale securities are reflected at their estimated fair value with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and reported in OCI pursuant to ASC 320. As of June 30, 2010, the fair value of these securities was $7.1 billion. When the spread between the yield on our agency securities and U.S. Treasuries or swap rates widens, this could cause the value of our agency securities to decline, creating what we refer to as spread risk. The spread risk associated with our agency securities and the resulting fluctuations in fair value of these securities can occur independent of interest rates and may relate to other factors impacting the mortgage and fixed income markets such as liquidity or changes in required rates of return on different assets.

The whole ‘fair value’ accounting smells like government authorized fraud.

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High dividend stocks – AGNC analysis of the income account> extraordinary losses> manufactured earnings

Today’s goal is to determine whether or not American Capital Agency Corp. (AGNC) wrote down any inventories or receivables as a charge to their surplus account since 2008.   Many companies did this during the Great Depression in order to make the next year’s income numbers look better than they really were.

“If the receivables and inventories were written down to an unduly low figure on December 31, 1932, this artificially low “cost price” would give rise to a correspondingly inflated profit in the following years.” – Securities Analysis chapter 32 section on manufactured earnings examples.

It appears to me that AGNC did not write down any inventories or receivables as a charge to surplus from 2008 to 2010.  Gains and losses in the values of its agency securities portfolio, hedges, and other assets appear on the current income statement for Q2 2010.  Therefore, I don’t think that AGNC is charging extraordinary losses to its surplus account in order to inflate its profit in the following year.  No adjustments to the income account are necessary for this category of analysis.

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High dividend stocks – AGNC analysis of the income account> non-recurrent earnings> other non-recurrent items

The remaining group of non-recurrent profit items is not important enough to merit detailed discussion.  In most cases it is of minor consequence whether they appear as part of the year’s earnings or are credited to surplus where they properly belong.

AGNC did not have any non-recurrent profit items (2008-2010), so this is not applicable to AGNC.

High dividend stocks – AGNC analysis of the income account> non-recurrent earnings> profits through repurchase of senior securities at a discount

At times a substantial profit is realized by corporations through the repurchase of their own senior securities at less than par value. The inclusion of such gains in current income is certainly a misleading practice, first, because they are obviously nonrecurring and, second, because this is at best a questionable sort of profit, since it is made at the expense of the company’s own security holders.

AGNC has not issued any senior securities, so this is not applicable to AGNC.

Key definitions:
Par value - A value set as the face amount of a security, typically expressed as multiples of $100 or $1,000.  Bondholders receive par value for their bonds on maturity.  Source (www.finance.alberta.ca/business/ahstf/glossary.html)

Senior securities - Notes, bonds, debentures, or preferred stocks whose claim on earnings and assets ranks ahead of common stock. Should a company liquidate, the claims of a senior security holders ranks above those of junior security holders because the company's creditors receive recompensation before the owners.  Source (www.bluecollardollar.com/mutualglossaryq_z.html)

High dividend stocks – Analysis of AGNC income account> non-recurrent earnings> sale of marketable securities

Profits from Sale of Marketable Securities.

Most businesses do not sell marketable securities in the normal course of their business operations.  Profits realized by a business corporation from the sale of marketable securities are also of a special character and must be separated from the ordinary operating results (unless that corporation is an insurance company, bank, or investment-trust).  AGNC is a real estate investment trust so it buys and sells marketable securities in the normal course of it business operations.

The bottom line is to stay away from investing in financial securities (like AGNC) because their earning power is difficult to determine and their asset values can be very volatile.
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Reprint of the applicable section of the 1934 edition of Securities Analysis concerning the profit/loss from the sale of marketable securities:

Methods Used by Investment Trusts in Reporting Sale of Marketable Securities. Investment-trust statements raise special questions with respect to the treatment of profits or losses realized from the sale of securities and changes in security values. Prior to 1930 most of these companies reported profits from the sale of securities as part of their regular income, but they showed the appreciation on unsold securities in the form of a memorandum or footnote to the balance sheet. But when large losses were taken in 1930 and subsequently, they were shown in most cases not in the income account but as charges against capital, surplus, or reserves. The unrealized depreciation was still recorded by most companies in the form of an explanatory comment on the balance sheet, which continued to carry the securities owned at original cost. A minority of investment trusts reduced the carrying price of their portfolio to the market by means of charges against capital and surplus.

It may logically be contended that, since dealing in securities is an integral part of the investment-trust business, the results from sales and even the changes in portfolio values should be regarded as ordinary rather than extraordinary elements in the year’s report. Certainly a study confined to the interest and dividend receipts less expenses would prove of negligible value. If any useful results can be expected from an analysis of investment-trust exhibits, such analysis must clearly be based on the three items: investment income, profits or losses on the sale of securities and changes in market values. It is equally obvious that the gain or shrinkage, so computed, in any one year is no indication whatever of earning power in the recurrent sense. Nor can an average taken over several years have any significance for the future unless the results are first compared with some appropriate measure of general market performance. Assuming that an investment trust has done substantially better than the relevant “average,” this is of course a prima facie indication of capable management. But even here it would be difficult to distinguish confidently between superior ability and luckier guesses on the market.

The gist of this critique is twofold: (1) the over-all change in principal value is the only available measure of investment-trust performance, but (2) this measure cannot be regarded as an index of “normal earning power” in any sense analogous to the recorded earnings of a well-entrenched industrial business.

Similar Problem in the Case of Banks and Insurance Companies. A like problem is involved in analyzing the results shown by insurance companies and by banks. Public interest in insurance securities is concentrated largely upon the shares of fire insurance companies. These enterprises represent a combination of the insurance business and the investment trust business. They have available for investment their capital funds plus substantial amounts received as premiums paid in advance. Generally speaking, only a small portion of these funds is subject to legal restrictions as regards investment, and the balance is handled in much the same way as the resources of the investment trusts. The underwriting business as such has rarely proved highly profitable. Frequently it shows a deficit, which is offset, however, by interest and dividend income. The profits or losses shown on security operations, including changes in their market value, exert a predominant influence upon the public’s attitude toward fire-insurance-company stocks. The same has been true of bank stocks to a smaller, but none the less significant, degree. The tremendous over speculation in these issues during the late 1920’s was stimulated largely by the participation of the banks, directly or through affiliates, in the fabulous profits made in the securities markets.

Since 1933 banks have been required to divorce themselves from their affiliates, and their operations in securities other than government issues have been more carefully supervised and restricted. But in view of the large portion of their resources invested in bonds, substantial changes in bond prices are still likely to exert a pronounced effect upon their reported earnings.

The fact that the operations of financial institutions generally—such as investment trusts, banks and insurance companies—must necessarily reflect changes in security values makes their shares a dangerous medium for widespread public dealings. Since in these enterprises an increase in security values may be held to be part of the year’s profits, there is an inevitable tendency to regard the gains made in good times as part of the “earning power” and to value the shares accordingly. This results of course in an absurd overvaluation, to be followed by collapse and a correspondingly excessive depreciation. Such violent fluctuations are particularly harmful in the case of financial institutions because they may affect public confidence. It is true also that rampant speculation (called “investment”) in bank and insurance-company stocks leads to the ill-advised launching of new enterprises, to the unwise expansion of old ones and to a general relaxation of established standards of conservatism and even of probity.

The securities analyst, in discharging his function of investment counselor, should do his best to discourage the purchase of stocks of banking and insurance institutions by the ordinary small investor. Prior to the boom of the 1920’s such securities were owned almost exclusively by those having or commanding large financial experience and matured judgment. These qualities are needed to avoid the special danger of misjudging values in this field by reason of the dependence of their reported earnings upon fluctuations in security prices.

Herein lays also a paradoxical difficulty of the investment-trust movement. Given a proper technique of management, these organizations may well prove a logical vehicle for the placing of small investor’s funds. But considered as a marketable security dealt in by small investors, the investment-trust stock itself is a dangerously volatile instrument. Apparently this troublesome factor can be held in check only be educating or by effectively cautioning the general public on the interpretation of investment trust reports. The prospects of accomplishing this are none too bright.

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High dividend stocks – Terminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

I don’t like government intervention in any markets.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac represent massive government intrusion into the mortgage markets since the 1930s.  Without government life support they would go out of business.  The US federal government will be on life support itself in the next few years due decades of ever increasing deficit spending.  The congress will pull the life support away from Fannie and Freddie in order to save their own careers when they can no longer kick the can.  It is a question of when - not if.
So what happens to AGNC’s common stock price when that happens?  We’ll have to really scrutinize its earning statements and balance sheets to understand how exposed they are to these two GSEs.  My guess is very exposed.  We don’t have to play the game when we know it is rigged.

I think you will like this article by Michael Rozeff from www.lewrockwell.com.  I'm pretty sure it was written in late 2008 which was just after AGNC's IPO in May 2008.

Terminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
by Michael S. Rozeff

I am a minority of one, or a very small number, in thinking that the failures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are good news.

These two companies should not exist. No private companies should have lines of credit to the U.S. Treasury, that is, U.S. taxpayers. No private companies should be linked to a government mandate that they facilitate affordable housing by buying up mortgages. No private companies should issue debts that investors believe may have an implicit guarantee provided by taxpayers.

The only bad thing about these failures is what the Federal government may do next to keep them alive. The only bad thing is that the Federal government will probably make matters worse.

This is a golden opportunity to end these enterprises once and for all. And doing that is incredibly simple! Any Wall Street investment bank can, in short order, produce a plan to restructure these companies and charge the appropriate (high) fees for carrying out that plan. The possible ways to restructure include sales of the assets, creating subsidiaries and selling them, spinning off subsidiary companies, and breaking up the company into several companies. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could also put their entire companies up for sale.

Such restructurings are Wall Street’s bread and butter. The equity values of these companies have already fallen considerably. Their value in a restructuring may be quite small, but control does have a non-negligible value. The markets are already pricing the debts of these two giants at less than face value, despite the chance of an implicit guarantee or a taxpayer bailout. The debt-holders took a chance buying this paper. They should bear the consequences. Restructuring will reveal the true worth of these debt securities.

Investors in these enterprises, both debt and equity holders, should not be bailed out by the taxpayers. These two companies made bad investments by buying mortgages that have gone bad. These two companies also issued too much debt to finance these investments, which gave them very shaky financial structures. The worth of their assets is less than the worth of their liabilities, which makes them insolvent. They are not yet bankrupt. They still have the cash to service their debts. These debts are by no means worthless. About 11.6 percent of money market funds are invested in agency debt. At current prices of these debts, news of money market troubles has not surfaced. If those prices fell by 10 percent, the money market losses would be a modest 1 percent.

Any restructuring presumes what is not in evidence, which is that the Federal government has to sever completely its relationships with housing markets and specifically with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. There’s the rub. Congress won’t do this, unless seized by some unforeseen miracle of rationality.

There are millions of Americans who may fear the dissolution of these companies. They will wonder where they will get mortgages from. There are hundreds of columnists who share this fear. Some will pretend to hold their nose while supporting a government bailout. Some will want to maintain the government’s interference in housing markets or even expand it as a matter of public policy.

There is nothing to fear. The amount of money on the sidelines that is available for funding mortgages is tremendous. It can be coaxed into mortgages if the interest rates paid are high enough. A free market in mortgages will easily provide capital to creditworthy borrowers. But that too is the rub. The government wants to keep mortgage rates low so as to keep the housing industry going and to satisfy the voters who take out mortgages. The government does not want a free market in mortgages, and that is because neither voters nor the housing industry want a free market in housing. As long as there is a government that is empowered to interfere, the pressure to interfere will overcome the free market.

Democracy just does not work, my friends! Sooner or later, in this case 70 years later, 70 years after Fannie Mae began, the system starts to break down. Call it what you will, democratic socialism or democratic fascism or both, democracy does not work. It doesn’t work in agriculture, in the military, in the space program, in the banking system, or in any other part of an economy. Sooner or later, depending on various particulars, blowups occur.

Without the government in the picture, there is no way that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could ever have grown so large. Their balance sheet assets (and liabilities) total about $1.6 trillion. They have off-balance liabilities of another $3.5 trillion or so. How big is $5 trillion? The national debt of the U.S. is $9.5 trillion!

It is almost unbelievable that these two companies could have run up debts that are more than half the size of the country’s national debt. But that is inherent in the chemistry of government + housing + debt guarantees. The housing market is huge, especially over time as the housing stock accumulates. By giving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac an advantage in issuing debt, these companies came to dominate the housing finance market. There is no better time than now to end this absurdity.

Freddie Mac faces huge losses, as much as $775,000,000. Its equity can easily be wiped out. That means bankruptcy. That is nothing to fear, either. That means that restructuring will be forced upon the company. The point is to let it happen and happen quickly and get the government out of the picture altogether.

Naturally, this has not been what the government has been doing. Instead, it has done the opposite so far. Congress has passed a bill that awaits the President’s signature or veto. There will be a deal. The bill increases mortgage loan limits drastically. Smart move, guys. Pelosi wants them even higher, $730,000 instead of $625,000.

Mr. Corruption himself, Chris Dodd, is the lead sponsor of the bill. Even as the stocks of these two companies approach $0, he reassures the public that the CEOs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and Ben Bernanke tell him that they are not at risk of default. This is a bald-faced lie. Failure to face and state truths is a national addiction. The predilection to lie in the face of bad news is so ingrained that our leaders no longer can even detect the difference between what is true and what is false. They lie and they know they lie. But they also believe their lies because they believe their lies to be political necessities.

Can liars even begin to think straight about what should be done that is in the long-run interest of the American public? If they could think straight, could they summon the courage to act? Democracy encourages lies, liars, and cowardice in the face of voters and payoffs. Democracy just does not work, my friends.

Terminate Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Sever the relations with the government and let Wall Street, or investment bankers in San Francisco or Austin or Boston or Tallahassee do what they know best, which is restructure these companies. All the mortgages held or guaranteed by them will still be held and serviced, but by new companies and new investors. Problem solved.

July 16, 2008

Michael S. Rozeff [send him mail] is a retired Professor of Finance living in East Amherst, New York.

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High dividend stocks – Analysis of AGNC’s income account> non-recurrent items> profits or losses from sale of fixed assets.

Non-recurrent Items: Profits or Losses from Sale of Fixed Assets.

Profits or losses from the sale of fixed assets belong quite obviously to the category of fixed assets, and they should be excluded from the year’s result in order to gain an idea of the “indicated earning power” based on the assumed continuance of the business conditions existing then. Approved accounting practice recommends that profit on sales of capital assets be shown only as a credit to the surplus account. In numerous instances, however, such profits are reported by the company as part of its current net income, creating a distorted picture of the earnings for the period.

AGNC does not possess any fixed assets.  It has no employees or buildings because it is externally managed by American Agency Capital Management LLC.  No adjustments to earnings are required for this nonexistent item in AGNC’s earnings statements from mid-2008 to June 2010.
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I'm reprinting a section from the 1934 edition of Securities Analysis concerning subject of sale of fixed assets:

Examples: A glaring example of this practice is presented by the report of the Manhattan Electrical Supply Company for 1926. This showed earnings of $882,000, or $10.25 per share, which was regarded as a very favorable exhibit. But a subsequent application to list additional shares on the New York Stock Exchange revealed that out of this $882,000 reported as earned, no less than $586,700 had been realized through the sale of the company’s battery business. Hence the earnings from ordinary operations were only $295,300, or about $3.40 per share. The inclusion of this special profit in income was particularly objectionable because in the very same year the company had charged to surplus extraordinary losses amounting to $544,000. Obviously the special losses belonged to the same category as the special profits, and the two items should have been grouped together. The effect of including the one in income and charging the other to surplus was misleading in the highest degree. Still more discreditable was the failure to make any clear reference to the profit from the battery sale either in the income account itself or in the extended remarks that accompanied it in the annual report.

During 1931 the United States Steel Corporation reported “special income” of some $19,300,000, the greater part of which was due to “profit on sale of fixed property”—understood to be certain public-utility holdings in Gary, Indiana. This item was included in the year’s earnings and resulted in a final “net income” of $13,000,000. But since this credit was definitely of a nonrecurring nature, the analyst would be compelled to eliminate it from his consideration of the 1931 operating results, which would accordingly register a loss of $6,300,000 before preferred dividends. United States Steel’s accounting method in 1931 is at variance with its previous policy, as shown by its treatment of the large sums received in the form of income-tax refunds in the three preceding years. These receipts were not reported as current income but were credited directly to surplus.
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